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Cultural Defense: One Person's Culture Is
Another's Crime
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 29, 1985, Mrs. Fumiko Kimura, along with her two
children, waded into the Pacific Ocean ten days after learning that her
husband had kept a mistress for three years.1 Mrs. Kimura was
saved.2 However, her six-month old daughter and her four-year old
son drowned. 3 The purpose of Mrs. Kimura's suicide attempt was
culturally based.4 Mrs. Kimura's actions stemmed from her desire to
rid herself and her children of the shame caused by her husband hav-
ing a mistress.5
The Japanese tradition of parent-child suicide, as well as other
Asian culturally based acts, such as marriage by capture, were virtu-
ally unheard of by American lawyers, judges, and law enforcement
officials until recently. However, due to the large influx of Asians into
the United States, a clash between Asian cultures and the American
criminal justice system currently exists.
6
In 1975, as a result of the communist takeover in Vietnam, Laos,
and Cambodia, nearly 800,000 Indochinese refugees were given per-
manent asylum in the United States.7 Many of the newcomers had
difficulties assimilating and learning the American culture and laws.
8
Consequently, those immigrants and refugees still maintain many be-
liefs and traditions of their native lifestyles, despite living in the
United States for several years.9 Legal problems often arise when
these immigrants adhere to customs and traditions that constitute ille-
gal acts under laws of the United States.
This Comment discusses whether the American criminal justice
1. L.A. Times, Feb. 24, 1985, pt. I, at 3, cot. 1.
2. Id.
3. L.A. Times, Feb. 3, 1985, pt. II, at 3, col. 1.
4. Hayashi, Understanding Shinju, and the Trajedy of Fumiko Kimura, L.A. Times,
Apr. 10, 1985, pt. II, at 5, col. 1.
5. Id.
6. Thompson, Immigrants Bring the Cultural Defense into US. Courts, Wall St. J., June
6, 1985, at 26, col. 5 (western ed.).
7. Sherman, Legal Clash of Cultures, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 5, 1985, at 26, col. 1.
8. Id. at col. 3.
9. Id.
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system should recognize a "cultural defense."' 10 Recognition of the
concept of a cultural defense may exonerate the foreigner of any
wrongdoing if an otherwise illegal act would have been acceptable in
the foreigner's homeland." This defense is especially urged in in-
stances in which the foreigner maintains a set of values alien to tradi-
tional American values. Although United States courts generally do
not recognize a specific "cultural defense,"' 2 there have been instances
where cultural differences were considered.'
3
This Comment initially focuses on two cases which illustrate the
conflict that can exist between a defendant's culture and certain state
laws. The first case concerns the conflict between a Japanese custom
called parent-child suicide, oyako-shinju, and the California murder
statute.14 The second case concerns the conflict between a Hmong
tradition known as marriage by capture, zijpoj niam, and the Califor-
nia rape statute. 15 The Model Penal Code' 6 is also applied to the
above cases. In each instance there is a comparison between the ap-
plication of the Model Penal Code and the California Penal Code.
Finally, two different viewpoints on whether the American criminal
justice system should accept a cultural defense will be explored.
II. DiscUSSION
A. Anatomy of a Crime
There are two general components to almost every crime: one is
physical, the actus reus and the other is mental, the mens rea.17 The
10. See infra text accompanying note 11 for a definition of cultural defense. It has been
suggested that the courts adopt a formal cultural defense within the substantive criminal law.
Note, The Cultural Defense in the Criminal Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1293, 1311 (1986). The
author points out that "America's commitment to the ideals of individualized justice and cul-
tural pluralism justifies the recognition of the cultural defense." Id. at 1307. This Comment
acknowledges that certain ethnic values need to be preserved in order to maintain a culturally
diverse society. See also id. at 1301. However, the Model Penal Code provides a framework
for considering a defendant's cultural values. This Comment specifically concentrates on two
cases where the Model Penal Code would have acknowledged the defendant's cultural values
in determining culpability and in sentencing the defendant. By adopting the Model Penal
Code's approach, the courts and legislature need not attempt to formulate a cultural defense.
11. Thompson, supra note 6, at 26.
12. Sherman, supra note 7, at 26, col. 1.
13. A "1923 study of immigrants in the courts cited a number of cases in which the
judges paid heed to a defense based on cultural differences." Thompson, Cultural Defense,
STUDENT LAW., Sept. 1985, at 25, 26.
14. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West Supp. 1987).
15. Id. § 261.
16. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.2, 210.3, 213.1 (1967).
17. R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 831 (3rd ed. 1982). Conspiracy, solicita-
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actus reus is best defined as the guilty act.18 There must be an overt
act or some open evidence of an intended crime before a person may
be punished. 19 There also must be a harm to society which is pro-
tected by a criminal statute or by the common law.20 Thus, there
must be both a social harm and an act by the accused which was the
cause of that harm.
One of the greatest contributions of the common law is the con-
cept that there is no crime, as distinguished from a civil offense, with-
out a mind at fault.21 Mens rea, which means a culpable state of mind
or the guilty mind, is the required mental element. 22 Nonetheless, the
state of mind needed for criminal guilt is not the same for all
offenses.
23
B. California Law and the Model Penal Code:
Parent-Child Suicide
1. Murder and manslaughter statutes
a. murder
California Penal Code section 187(a), which has adopted the
common law definition of murder, states that murder is "the unlawful
killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought. '24
California Penal Code section 189 provides that if a murder is perpe-
trated by means of a destructive device, or by any other kind of will-
ful, deliberate, and premeditated act, or is committed in the
perpetration of a felony, then it is murder of the first degree inasmuch
as each of these factors is an indicia of "malice aforethought. '25 Since
California Penal Code sections 187 and 189 have incorporated com-
mon law concepts in the definition of murder, 26 it will be helpful to
briefly overview the common law concept of malice aforethought.
Common law malice aforethought is classified by four different
tion and attempt to commit a crime seem to be a few of the exceptions to the concept that in a
crime there has to be both a mens rea and an actus reus. In the above crimes, the requirement
of mens rea alone may be sufficient for criminal guilt. Id. at 830.
18. Id. at 831.
19. Id. at 830.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 828.
22. Id. at 829.
23. Id.
24. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West Supp. 1987).
25. Id. § 189.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 27-38.
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states of mind.27 The most important state of mind is an intent to
kill.28 "Intent [to kill] includes those consequences which (a) repre-
sent the very purpose for which an act is done (regardless of likeli-
hood of occurrence), [or] (b) are known to be substantially certain to
result (regardless of desire)."'29 Hence, when one acts "for the pur-
pose of causing" a certain result, that person intends the result,
whether it is likely to happen or not.30 As to those consequences
which were not the "very purpose" of one's act, one intends only
those results which were substantially certain to be produced. 3' Ac-
cordingly, if one either intends or is aware that one's actions will re-
sult in the death of another, the killing is intentional, and the lack of
desire of such consequence does not rebutt one's intent.
32
The second common law category of murder is intent to cause
grievous bodily harm.33 Again, knowledge that the conduct was sub-
stantially certain to cause serious bodily injury would be construed as
the necessary intent. The person would be prosecuted for murder if
death actually was the result of an injury caused by grievous bodily
harm. 34 The third category is sometimes called the "depraved-heart"
murder.35 It is unintentional murder under circumstances evincing a
"depraved mind" or an "abandoned and malignant heart". 36 Califor-
nia Penal Code section 188 has incorporated this common law con-
cept in defining implied malice, an element of second degree murder.
37
Thus, there is an implied or presumed intent to kill or injure if the
accused exhibited a wanton and willful disregard of an unreasonable
human risk. The fourth kind of common law malice aforethought is
implied where there was an intent to commit a felony; it is the origin
27. 1 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, pt. II, § 210.2, at 14 (1980).
28. Id.
29. R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 17, at 835 (footnote omitted).
30. Id.
31. Id. An example of intent to kill would be if an individual exploded dynamite for the
purpose of wrecking a building and realized that another person was so close to the building
that it was substantially certain that the person would die. Id. at 834-35.
32. Id. at 834.
33. 1 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, pt. II, § 210.2, at 14-15 (1980).
34. Id. at 15.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. The California courts have consistently defined implied malice, which is a necessary
element of second degree murder, as a lack of considerable provocation or the presence of
circumstances indicating an abandoned and malignant heart. See People v. Watson, 30 Cal. 3d
290, 637 P.2d 279, 179 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1981); People v. Roy, 18 Cal. App. 3d 537, 95 Cal. Rptr.
884 (1971).
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of the modem felony-murder rule.38
California Penal Code section 7 defines malice as "a wish to vex,
annoy, or injure another person, or an intent to do a wrongful act,
established either by proof or presumption of law."' 39 However, the
Model Penal Code does not use malice as an element of murder be-
cause the drafters greatly disfavored the word. ° The Model Code
substitutes specific states of mind (i.e. purposely, knowingly, reck-
lessly or negligently) for "malice" when defining the elements of
murder. 41
Conversely, in California, malice is an important element of mur-
der. Malice may be either express or implied.42 Express malice is a
deliberate intent to unlawfully take the life of another human being.43
Implied malice, which is a necessary element of second degree mur-
der, exists "when no considerable provocation appears, or when the
circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malig-
nant heart." 44 Furthermore, California Penal Code section 188 pro-
vides that if a death results from the intentional doing of an act with
express or implied malice, no other mental state is needed to establish
malice aforethought.4 5
It is essential to recognize that if a person knows that their act is
wrongful, a good faith belief in the action would not negate malice.46
As a general rule, proof of motive is not a determinant of guilt or
38. 1 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, pt. II, § 210.2, at 15 (1980).
39. CAL. PENAL CODE § 7(4) (West Supp. 1987).
40. R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 17, at 860. The Model Penal Code's general
requirement of culpability requires that a person act "purposely, knowingly, recklessly or neg-
ligently, as the law may require, with respect to each material element of the offense." MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1962).
41. Under the Model Penal Code: "(1) [a] person is guilty of criminal homicide if he
purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently causes the death of another human being. (2)
Criminal homicide is murder, manslaughter or negligent homicide." Id. § 210.1. A person
convicted of murder may be sentenced to death, if that jurisdiction has retained the death
penalty, or imprisonment. Id. The prison penalty for first degree murder may range from one
to ten years imprisonment to the maximum of a life sentence. 1 MODEL PENAL CODE AND
COMMENTARIES, pt. II, § 210.2, at 42 (1980).
42. CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 (West Supp. 1987).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. Additionally, the statute was amended in 1981 and 1982 to further provide that
"[n]either an awareness of the obligation to act within the general body of laws regulating
society nor acting despite such awareness is included within the definition of malice." Act of
Sept. 10, 1982, ch. 893, 1982 Cal. Stats. 3317, 3318; Act of Sept. 10, 1981, ch. 405, 1981 Cal.
Stats. 1591, 1593.
46. People v. Weber, 162 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 208 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1984).
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innocence.47 Motive is distinguishable from intent .4  Motive is the
ultimate purpose or factor which induces the defendant to do what he
intended, such as killing the deceased.4 9 However, intent relates to
the method for achieving the ultimate purpose.50 A defendant's mo-
tive may be hatred, revenge, love or jealousy.51 In a case in which it is
clearly established that the defendant both committed the offense, the
actus reus, and had the requisite state of mind required for the partic-
ular offense, mens rea, proof of good motive will not save the defend-
ant from conviction.
5 2
Although every intentional killing is with malice aforethought,
certain circumstances, such as legal insanity constitute a justification,
an excuse or a mitigation.5 3 In June of 1982, the California electorate
approved an initiative measure, known as Proposition 8, which estab-
lished a statutory definition of insanity.54 California Penal Code sec-
tion 25(b) provides:
In any criminal proceeding.., in which a plea of not guilty by
reason of insanity is entered, this defense shall be found by the trier
of fact only when the accused person proves by a preponderance of
the evidence that [1] he or she was incapable of knowing or under-
standing the nature and quality of his or her act and [2] of distin-
guishing right from wrong at the time of the commission of the
offense.55
The California Supreme Court, in People v. Skinner,56 held that
section 25(b) reinstates the M'Naghten test. The two prong test was
intended to be applied as a disjunctive "or" rather than the conjunc-
tive "and" test.5 7 Additionally, the defendant is often found legally
47. R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 17, at 928. Motive may be a determinant of
guilt or innocence in an unusual case of homicide. For example, if someone kills a felon in
order to prevent an atrocious felony, and his motive was to promote social security, the person
is not guilty of murder, or any other offense, even though he had an intent to kill. Id. at 930.
48. Id. at 926.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 926-27.
51. Id. at 927.
52. Id. at 928-29. For example, one is guilty of bigamy if one intentionally takes two
wives due to sincere religious convictions. Id. at 929. Similarly, when someone drowns his or
her small children due to their love of those children, and they want to prevent them from
living in poverty, that person is still guilty of murder. Id.
53. R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 17, at 73.
54. CAL. PENAL CODE § 25 (West Supp. 1987); see People v. Skinner, 39 Cal. 3d 765,
768, 704 P.2d 752, 753, 217 Cal. Rptr. 685, 686 (1985).
55. CAL. PENAL CODE § 25(b) (West Supp. 1987).
56. 39 Cal. 3d 765, 704 P.2d 752, 217 Cal. Rptr. 685 (1985).
57. Id. at 775-77, 704 P.2d at 758-59, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 691-92.
756 [Vol. 9:751
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insane when at the time of the offense he was so mentally deranged or
diseased that he was not conscious of the wrongful nature of the act
committed. 58 The Court in Skinner further clarified the concept of
"wrong" in California Penal Code section 25(b) by stating that "a
defendant who is incapable of understanding that his act is morally
wrong is not criminally liable merely because he knows the act is un-
lawful." 59 Consequently, the concept of "wrong" is not limited to
legal wrong.60
Furthermore, in California, a defendant charged with murder
can no longer rebutt proof of malice aforethought by showing that his
or her mental capacity was diminished by mental illness, mental de-
fect or intoxication. 61 California Penal Code section 25(a) abolished
the defense of diminished capacity. 62 Although the defendant is still
permitted to produce psychiatric testimony regarding his or her
mental condition, the ultimate issue on whether the defendant had the
requisite mental state at the time of the offense is determined by the
trier of fact. 63 Therefore, basically, the legislature has limited the use
of expert testimony regarding defendant's mental condition.64
Unlike the California Penal Code, the Model Penal Code adopts
a simpler and more direct method for the jury to determine whether a
particular homicide is murder or manslaughter. Model Penal Code
section 210.2(1) provides, in pertinent part, that "criminal homicide
constitutes murder when: (a) it is committed purposely or knowingly;
or (b) it is committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting ex-
treme indifference to the value of human life."'65
Model Penal Code section 210.2(l)(a) focuses the inquiry on the
defendant's subjective state of mind.66 "[T]he prosecution must estab-
lish that the defendant engaged in conduct with the conscious objec-
58. Id. at 781-82, 704 P.2d at 762, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 695 (quoting People v. Willard, 150
Cal. 543, 554, 89 P. 124, 129 (1907)).
59. Id. at 783, 704 P.2d at 764, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 697.
60. Id.
61. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 25(a) (West Supp. 1987). The essence of a showing of di-
minished capacity is a "showing that the defendant's mental capacity was reduced by mental
illness, mental defect or intoxication." People v. Castillo, 70 Cal. 2d 264, 270, 449 P.2d 449,
452, 74 Cal. Rptr. 385, 388 (1969).
62. CAL. PENAL CODE § 25(a) (West Supp. 1987).
63. People v. McCowan, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1, 14, 227 Cal. Rptr. 23, 30 (1986); People v.
Whitler, 171 Cal. App. 3d 337, 341-42, 214 Cal. Rptr. 610, 613 (1985); see also CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 28-29 (West Supp. 1987).
64. McCowan, 182 Cal. App. 3d at 14, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 30.
65. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1) (1962).
66. 1 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, pt. II, § 210.2, at 20 (1980).
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tive of causing death of another or at least with awareness that death
of another was practically certain to result from his [or her] act."
'67
Such purposeful or knowing homicide demonstrates an indifference to
the value of human life.
68
Model Penal Code section 210.2(l)(b) is similar to California's
second-degree murder statute, when the killing is commited with an
abandoned and malignant heart. 69 This subsection includes homi-
cides caused by extreme recklessness without a purpose to kill. 70 Ba-
sically, recklessness, as defined in Model Penal Code section
2.02(2)(c), presupposes that the defendant is aware of creating a sub-
stantial homicidal risk.7t Nonetheless, the character of defendant's
conduct, whether it is lawful or not, is relevant in determining
whether taking the risk amounts to such a deviation from ordinary
conduct as to justify a finding of recklessness. 72 Thus, "inadvertent
risk creation, however extravagant and unjustified, cannot be pun-
ished as murder .... [T]he actor must perceive and consciously disre-




The crucial distinction between murder and manslaughter is the
requirement of malice aforethought. 74 Manslaughter, as defined in
California Penal Code section 192, "is the unlawful killing of a human
being without malice."' 75 Voluntary manslaughter is the unlawful kill-
ing of a human being without malice, resulting from a sudden quarrel
or while acting in the heat of passion.76 It is punishable by imprison-
ment in state prison for three, six or eleven years.77 Involuntary man-
slaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice
upon "commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony; or in
67. Id. at 21.
68. Id. at 21-22.
69. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(b) (1962) with CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 188-
189 (West Supp. 1987); see 1 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, pt. II, § 210.2, at
22 n.38 (1980).
70. 1 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, pt. II, § 210.2, at 22 (1980).
71. Id. at 21.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 27-28.
74. People v. Roberts, 51 Cal. App. 3d 125, 123 Cal. Rptr. 893 (1975); People v. Beyea,
38 Cal. App. 3d 176, 113 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1974).
75. CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West Supp. 1987).
76. Id. § 192(a).
77. Id. § 193(a).
[Vol. 9:751
One Person's Culture is Another's Crime
the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an un-
lawful manner, or without due caution or circumspection. ' '78 It is
punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three or four
years.
79
The Model Penal Code in a manner similar to the California Pe-
nal Code, recognizes certain factors that mitigate a criminal homicide
to the lesser offense of manslaughter. Under Model Penal Code sec-
tion 210.3(1):
Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter when: (a) it is com-
mitted recklessly; or (b) a homicide which would otherwise be
murder is committed under the influence of extreme mental or
emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or
excuse. The reasonableness of such explanation or excuse shal [sic]
be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situa-
tion under the circumstances as he [or she] believes them to be.80
The kind of recklessness required under Model Penal Code sec-
tions 210.2(l)(b) and 210.3(l)(a) is substantially the same and differs
only in degree of culpability. 81 The trier of fact ultimately determines
whether a certain recklessness is sufficient to justify a murder charge
or whether the act is to be punished as manslaughter.
82
Model Penal Code section 210.3(l)(b) includes the common law
doctrine of provocation-heat of passion, but in a broader scope.8 3 The
drafters of the Model Penal Code recognized the common law's firm
stance against individualization of the standard for determining ade-
quacy of provocation. 84 Yet, some characteristics of the defendant
must be considered. 85 For example, "[a] taunting attack that would
seem trivial to the ordinary citizen may be extremely threatening to
the blind man."'8 6 Consequently, the Model Penal Code places far
more emphasis on the defendant's subjective mental state.87
Under Model Penal Code section 210.3(l)(b), the jury is required
to consider the "actor's situation" and the "circumstances as he [or
78. Id. § 192(b).
79. Id. § 193(b).
80. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1) (1962).
81. 1 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, pt. II, § 210.3, at 53 (1980).
82. Id. § 210.2, at 22.
83. Id. § 210.3, at 53-54.
84. Id. at 56-57.
85. Id. at 56.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 54.
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she] believes them to be."' 88 The term "situation" is to be interpreted
with a certain flexibility; it includes blindness, extreme grief and
shock from traumatic injury. 89 The court determines which aspects
of the defendant's "situation" shall be a relevant mitigating factor. 90
There is also an objective element which requires a reasonable
explanation or excuse for the defendant's disturbance or mental con-
dition.91 However, section 210.3(l)(b) provides that the reasonable-
ness of such explanation or excuse be assessed from the view of a
person in the actor's situation.92 Accordingly, given the defendant's
"situation" the jury ultimately determines the "reasonableness" of the
defendant's conduct and excuse. 9
3
2. Parent-child suicide (oyako-shinju)
A recent controversial California case, People v. Kimura,94 at-
tracted nation-wide attention because the defendant, Mrs. Fumiko
Kimura, was charged with the first degree murder of her two children
after attempting parent-child suicide.95 Mrs. Kimura was emotionally
shattered by her husband's disloyalty. 96 In accordance with her Japa-
nese culture, she attempted to rid herself and her children from such
humiliation. 97 "[Mrs. Kimura] did not want the shame and humilia-
tion of ... divorce. Instead, she chose death. Seeing her children as
an extension of herself, she took their lives to complete her suicide
successfully."91 In Japan, a mother who kills herself and leaves her
children behind is criticized more harshly than the mother who also
takes the lives of her children. 99
Oyako-shinju, which means parent-child suicide, is a common oc-
88. Id. at 62.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 72-73.
91. Id. at 50.
92. Id. at 62.
93. Id. at 72.
94. People v. Kimura, No. A-09133 (L.A. Super. Ct. 1985); Sherman, supra note 7, at 1,
col. 3.
95. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
96. Hayashi, supra note 4, at 5, col. 1.
97. Id. at 5, col. 3.
98. Id. Mrs. Kimura explained that if she went without taking her children, the young-
sters would be abused. The children would be seen as extensions of her and would be hated as
well. L.A. Times, Nov. 22, 1985, pt. II, at 8, col. 3.
99. L.A. Times, Feb. 24, 1985, pt. I, at 3, col. 1. The observation was made by Dr.
Mamoru Iga, a Japanese sociologist at California State University at Northridge. Id.
[Vol. 9:751
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currence in Japan.1°° It has long been a part of Japanese culture. 10'
The Japanese prefer to die rather than to live in humiliation, and sui-
cide is considered an honorable way of dying. 10 2 "Parent-child sui-
cide is caused by the inseparable parent-child bond."' 0 3 Although
oyako-shinju is not murder in Japan, it is still against the law.'
°4
Oyako-shinju is punishable as involuntary manslaughter and generally
results in a light suspended sentence, probation and supervised
rehabilitation.105
Consequently, 4,000 members of the Japanese community in Los
Angeles filed a petition supporting Mrs. Kimura's actions due to their
common cultural heritage. 0 6 The petitioners claimed that Mrs.
Kimura's actions would not be considered murder in Japan. 10 7 Addi-
tionally, the petitioners asked the prosecutor to apply modem Japa-
nese law since the roots of Mrs. Kimura's Japanese culture'0 8 were
the underlying cause of her acts. 10 9
Contrary to the petitioners' demands, the prosecutor, defense at-
torney, and presiding judge agreed not to consider Mrs. Kimura's cul-
tural background. 10 Furthermore, Mrs. Kimura faced the death
penalty because the district attorney's office had alleged the special
circumstance of multiple murder.' Mrs. Kimura pleaded not guilty
100. Hayashi, supra note 4, at 5, col. 1. "In Japan, shinju is given the same slight media
attention as fatal traffic accidents are given in America." Id.
101. Id. at 5, cols. 1-2.
102. Id. at 5, col. 3.
103. Id. at 5, col. 2. Mrs. Kimura seemed to embrace Japanese tradition even more
strongly after the birth of her children. L.A. Times, Feb. 24, 1985, pt. I, at 30, col. 1. There
was strong evidence in support of her devotion to her children. Id.




108. Id. Although Mrs. Kimura had lived in the United States for fourteen years, she
remained Japanese in her thinking and lifestyle. L.A. Times, Feb. 24, 1985, pt. I, at 3, col. 1.
Suicide was a central theme in her recent marital troubles since she was not the only one
considering it; not only did her husband's Japanese mistress threaten suicide, so did Mr.
Kimura after his wife's suicide attempt. Id.
109. Sherman, supra note 7, at 26, col. 1.
110. The Deputy District Attorney, Lauren L. Weis, stated that the decision to accept
Mrs. Kimura's plea "was not based on the fact that Mrs. Kimura was Japanese, or that this
kind of thing does happen at times in Japan." L.A. Times, Oct. 19, 1985, pt. II, at 1, cols. 2-3.
Additionally, after the court's holding, both Ms. Weis and Gerald L. Klausner, the defense
attorney, stated that "cultural considerations played no role in the prosecution's recommenda-
tion of probation." L.A. Times, Nov. 22, 1985, pt. II, at 8, col. 3. Finally, the judge stated
that the petitions supporting Mrs. Kimura "played no part in his decision." Id. at 1, col. 5.
111. L.A. Times, Apr. 19, 1985, pt. II, at 1, col. 6.
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to two counts of murder and two counts of felony child endanger-
ing. "1 2 After entering into a plea bargain, Mrs. Kimura was allowed
to plead no contest to two counts of voluntary manslaughter.' 13 The
court sentenced Mrs. Kimura to one year in prison and five years
probation. 
114
According to the prosecution, the determinant factor which re-
duced Mrs. Kimura's charge was that "she was not a rational person
at the time of the act."' 115 Psychiatrists testified that Mrs. Kimura
was suffering from psychotic depression and delusions when she at-
tempted to commit parent-child suicide. 1 6 One of the doctors stated
that it was an "impulsive, unpremeditated act."' 17 Furthermore, psy-
chiatric reports indicated that Mrs. Kimura failed to have the re-
quired malice aforethought at the time of the crime."18
Therefore, the court in Kimura refused to consider Mrs.
Kimura's Japanese culture and instead opted to base its judgment on
lack of sanity and concomitant emotional illness. The end result, in
effect, was the same as if the case had been decided by a Japanese
court, namely, that Mrs. Kimura was guilty of manslaughter. The
Kimura court applied a different means to reach the same end.
3. Application of the California murder and manslaughter statute
a. first-degree murder
Mrs. Kimura would be guilty of first degree murder under the
California Penal Code section 189 if she (1) intended to kill her chil-
dren (with malice aforethought) and (2) premeditated and deliberated
her suicide attempt.119
Mrs. Kimura's act of carrying her children into the ocean would
create a strong presumption that she intended to kill herself and her
112. Id.
113. L.A. Times, Oct. 19, 1985, pt. II, at 1, col. 1.
114. L.A. Times, Nov. 22, 1985, pt. II, at 1, col. 5. When the court sentenced Mrs.
Kimura to one year in prison, on November 21,1985, she had already served her time. Id. She
had been in custody for 297 days, plus she received 149 days for good conduct. Id. The judge
further stated that Mrs. Kimura had to undergo counseling. Id.
115. Id. at 8, col. 3. This Comment assumes that the rational person standard as applied
in this context means how the average rational person would act in the United States rather
than in Japan. In the United States, the "reasonable man" probably would not commit parent-
child suicide. See Howard, Wat Colour is the "Reasonable Man"?, 1961 CRIM. L. REV. 41.
116. L.A. Times, Nov. 22, 1985, pt. II, at 8, col. 1.
117. Id.
118. L.A. Times, Oct. 19, 1985, pt. II, at 3, col. 5.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 24-28.
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young children. Mrs. Kimura wanted to rid herself and her children
of the shame and humiliation of divorce.' 2° Thus, one could infer
from the facts that Mrs. Kimura realized that her actions would re-
sult in her death and the death of her children.
On the other hand, one could argue that Mrs. Kimura did not
intend to kill her children since she considered her children to be an
extension of herself.1 21 Consequently, when Mrs. Kimura committed
oyako-shinju, she only intended to kill herself.122 However, it is
highly unlikely that a California court would ever accept such an ex-
planation. Instead, a court, without considering Mrs. Kimura's cul-
ture, would probably find that she intended to kill her children.1 23
The California Supreme Court in People v. Anderson 124 recog-
nized that the legislative classification of murder into two degrees
would be meaningless if premeditation and deliberation were con-
strued as requiring more reflection than may be involved in a specific
intent crime. 125 In Anderson, the three types of evidence sufficient to
sustain a finding of premeditation and deliberation were identified as:
(1) facts showing that the defendant engaged in planning activity prior
to the killing; (2) proof of the defendant's prior conduct with the vic-
tim from which the jury could reasonably infer a motive for a planned
killing; and (3) evidence that the manner of the killing was so particu-
lar and exacting that the jury could infer that it was carried out ac-
cording to a preconceived design and for a specific reason. 126
In Kimura, the evidence fails to support the conclusion that Mrs.
Kimura's actions were premeditated and deliberate. The evidence of
planning activity is especially weak. The day Mrs. Kimura attempted
to commit suicide, she took her children to their appointment with
the pediatrician. 27 She left the office after she was told to wait for the
doctor. 28 Mrs. Kimura then went to a travel agency to purchase air-
line tickets for herself and her children to go back to Japan. 29 From
there, Mrs. Kimura rode the bus to the Santa Monica beach. 30 From
120. Hayashi, supra note 4, at 5, col. 3.
121. Id.
122. See L.A. Times, Feb. 24, 1985, pt. I, at 3, col. 1.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 112-14.
124. 70 Cal. 2d 15, 447 P.2d 942, 73 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1968).
125. Id. at 26, 447 P.2d at 948, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 556.
126. Id. at 26-27, 447 P.2d at 949, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 557.
127. L.A. Times, Feb. 24, 1985, pt. I, at 30, col. 2.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. L.A. Times, Nov. 22, 1985, pt. II, at 8, col. 5.
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these activities, it is arguable that Mrs. Kimura was not acting pursu-
ant to a preconceived design to commit parent-child suicide.
Additionally, Mrs. Kimura was devoted to her children's safety
and care.131 Her entire life revolved around taking care of her chil-
dren. 132 "She kept a written schedule of each day's activities, alloting
specific times for cleaning, cooking and playing with her son."'
133
Therefore, Mrs. Kimura had no apparent motive to harm her
children.
Finally, the fact that Mrs. Kimura walked slowly across the
Santa Monica beach heading towards the ocean is inconsistent with
the notion that the manner of the killing was so particular or exacting
as to infer a preconceived design on Mrs. Kimura's part to kill her
children. 134 The reason is that in a public area there is a strong likeli-
hood that someone would detect the danger and save her children
from drowning.
Nonetheless, a jury may disagree that Mrs. Kimura's actions
were hasty and impulsive. Instead, the jury, in recognizing Mrs.
Kimura's cultural background and the prevalence of parent-child sui-
cide in Japan,' 35 may infer that Mrs. Kimura premeditated the suicide
attempt during her bus trip to Santa Monica. Under the first prong of
the Anderson test, the duration of time between the calculated, delib-
erate judgment or plan and the act itself is not the determinative
factor. 136
The true test is not the duration of time as much as it is the extent
of the reflection. Thoughts may follow each other with great ra-
pidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly, but
the express requirement for a concurrence of deliberation and pre-
meditation excludes.., those homicides ... which are the result of
mere unconsidered or rash impulse hastily executed. 1
37
Additionally, the jury may find that Mrs. Kimura had a strong
motive to commit parent-child suicide. Due to Mrs. Kimura's Japa-
nese culture, she felt obligated to take the lives of her children in or-
131. L.A. Times, Feb. 24, 1985, pt. I, at 30, col. 1.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Anderson, 70 Cal.2d at 27, 447 P.2d at 949, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 557.
135. Hayashi, supra note 4, at 5, col. 1.
136. People v. Velasquez, 26 Cal. 3d 425, 435, 606 P.2d 341, 346, 162 Cal. Rptr. 306, 311
(1980).
137. Id. (citing People v. Thomas, 25 Cal. 2d 880, 900-01, 156 P.2d 7, 18 (1945)).
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der to save them from future disgrace. 138 Consequently, if the jury
considered Mrs. Kimura's cultural background, she might have been
found guilty of first degree murder.
b. second degree murder
Assuming a court maintains that there is insufficient evidence to
support a finding that Mrs. Kimura premeditated and deliberated the
suicide attempt, she could be convicted of second degree murder. For
second degree murder, malice may be implied where there is a show-
ing of an abandoned and malignant heart. 139 Such a condition is met
when the defendant commits an act with a: (1) high probability that it
will result in death; (2) base anti-social motive; and (3) wanton disre-
gard for human life. 14°
Although there was substantial evidence of Mrs. Kimura's love
and devotion to her children,1 41 the jury could still hold Mrs. Kimura
guilty of second degree murder. The courts have consistently stated
that "[i]ll will toward or hatred of the victim are not requisites of
malice." 142 However, there was certainly a high probability that Mrs.
Kimura's act of walking into the ocean with her two young children
would result in her children's tragic death. Therefore, the jury could
infer that Mrs. Kimura acted with wanton disregard for the lives of
her children.
c. voluntary manslaughter
"[V]oluntary manslaughter in the heat of passion is unique in
that the statutory definition of the offense specifies the circumstances
in which the law will presume the absence of malice, the element
which distinguishes murder from manslaughter."1 43 The reason for
such a presumption is that the legislature has recognized the frailty of
human nature when subject to great provocation and has decided to
impose a lighter penalty under such circumstances. 144 Thus, even
though a killing was intentional, absence of malice is presumed if it
138. See supra text accompanying notes 96-99.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
140. People v. Watson, 30 Cal. 3d 290, 299, 637 P.2d 279, 284, 179 Cal. Rptr. 43, 48-49
(1981).
141. See supra text accompanying notes 131-33.
142. People v. Sedeno, 10 Cal. 3d 703, 722, 518 P.2d 913, 926, 112 Cal. Rptr. 1, 14 (1974).
143. Id. at 719, 518 P.2d at 923, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
144. People v. Washington, 58 Cal. App. 3d 620, 624, 130 Cal. Rptr. 96, 98 (1976) (quot-
ing People v. Bender, 27 Cal. 2d 164, 181, 163 P.2d 8, 18 (1945)).
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was committed in a heat of passion upon sufficient provocation. 45
In the present case, there was evidence that Mrs. Kimura was
continuously provoked by her husband's mistress. The mistress con-
tacted Mrs. Kimura ten days before the drownings. 46 She disclosed
to Mrs. Kimura the details of Mr. Kimura's infidelity; the mistress
offered to take her own life.' 47 Mrs. Kimura was in great anguish
after realizing the extent of her husband's love for the mistress.
48
Mrs. Kimura felt that she was an inadequate wife and a bad
mother. 49 Hence, it can be contended that due to the provocative
conduct of the mistress and Mrs. Kimura's cultural background, Mrs.
Kimura's reasoning was obscured by intense emotions during the sui-
cide attempt.
However, in order for a court to find Mrs. Kimura guilty of vol-
untary manslaughter under the heat of passion theory, both the objec-
tive and subjective elements need to be satisfied. 50 The objective
standard requires that the heat of passion:
be such a passion as would naturally be aroused in the mind of an
ordinary reasonable person under the given facts and circum-
stances, and ... consequently, no defendant may set up his own
standard of conduct and justify or excuse himself because in fact
his passions were aroused, unless ... the facts and circumstances
were sufficient to arouse the passions of the ordinarily reasonable
man .... For the fundamental... inquiry is whether or not the
defendant's reason was, at the time of his act, so disturbed or ob-
scured by some passion ... to such an extent as would render
ordinary men of average disposition liable to act rashly or without
due deliberation and reflection, and from this passion rather than
from judgment. -5 1
"The subjective element requires that the actor be under the ac-
tual influence of a strong passion at the time of the homicide ...
That (passion) need not mean (rage) or (anger) but may be any vio-
145. Sedeno, 10 Cal. 3d at 719, 518 P.2d at 923, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
146. L.A. Times, Feb. 24, 1985, pt. I, at 30, col. 1.
147. Id. at cols. 1-2.
148. Id. at col. 2.
149. L.A. Times, Nov. 22, 1985, pt. II, at 8, col. 1.
150. See People v. Thomas C., 183 Cal. App. 3d 786, 798, 228 Cal. Rptr. 430, 437 (1986).
151. Id. at 798, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 438 (emphasis added by court in People v. Thomas C.)
(quoting People v. Wickersham, 32 Cal. 3d 307, 326, 650 P.2d 311, 321, 185 Cal. Rptr. 436,
446 (1982) (footnote omitted)). California courts have strictly construed the reasonable man
test. For example, in People v. Washington, the court held that the jury properly determined
defendant's heat of passion defense by standards applicable to the average male rather than the
average homosexual. Washington, 58 Cal. App. 3d at 625, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 98.
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lent, intense, high-wrought or enthusiastic emotion."' 15 2
Mrs. Kimura's actions probably would qualify under the subjec-
tive test. She certainly was under the actual influence of a strong pas-
sion at the time of the suicide attempt. 153 This conclusion is
supported by the psychiatrists' reports that Mrs. Kimura was suffer-
ing from psychotic depression and delusions. 5 4 Consequently, it
would be difficult for the prosecutor to contend that the suicide at-
tempt did not occur in the heat of passion because Mrs. Kimura had
"cooled off."' 155
Nonetheless, the jury could find that the objective element had
not been met. Although Mrs. Kimura was going through a tor-
menting period, the provocation may be insufficient to cause an ordi-
nary man or woman of average disposition to harbor such an extreme
passion. Accordingly, the court could hold that an ordinary reason-
able man or woman would not act so rashly as to commit parent-child
suicide after learning about their spouse's disloyalty.
15 6
However, a Japanese jury applying an objective test would proba-
bly not find it unreasonable for a dedicated and loving mother to rid
herself and her children from such a disgrace.5 7 Mrs. Kimura's pain
and suffering and sense of degradation would be readily understood
under Japanese customs. 58 A Japanese jury might consider Mrs.
Kimura's actions to be an honorable way of dying. 59
Even assuming California law would recognize Mrs. Kimura's
sense of shame in applying this objective test, the California Court of
Appeals in People v. Spurlin '60 found that voluntary manslaughter
generally applies to instances where the provocation was caused by
the victim. 161 Although the California Supreme Court has not di-
152. Wickersham, 32 Cal. 3d at 327, 650 P.2d at 321, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 446 (quoting
People v. Berry, 18 Cal. 3d 509, 515, 556 P.2d 777, 780, 134 Cal. Rptr. 415, 418 (1976)).
153. L.A. Times, Oct. 19, 1985, pt. II, at 3, col. 6; see also L.A. Times, Feb. 24, 1985, pt. I,
at 31, col. 1.
154. L.A. Times, Nov. 22, 1985, pt. II, at 8, col. 1.
155. See People v. Berry, 18 Cal. 3d 509, 516, 556 P.2d 777, 781, 134 Cal. Rptr. 415, 419
(1976). The cooling period is when "sufficient time has elapsed between the provocation and
the fatal blow for passion to subside and reason to return." Wickersham, 32 Cal. 3d at 327, 650
P.2d at 321, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 446.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 95-99.
157. Hayashi, supra note 4, at 5, cols. 2-3.
158. Id.
159. L.A. Times, Oct. 19, 1985, pt. II, at 1, col. 2.
160. 156 Cal. App. 3d 119, 202 Cal. Rptr. 663 (1984).
161. Id. at 125-26, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 667. In Spurlin, the court found that the defendant
was not entitled to a manslaughter instruction with reference to the killing of his son. Id. at
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rectly ruled on this issue, decisions subsequent to Spurlin have re-
quired provocatory conduct from the victim.162 Accordingly, in
Kimura, a court following Spurlin would not entitle Mrs. Kimura to a
heat of passion defense since the victims, her young children, did not
cause the provocation. 1
63
4. Application of the Model Penal Code
Under Model Penal Code section 210.2(l),164 Mrs. Kimura could
be convicted of murder. The jury could find that Mrs. Kimura was
aware that walking into the ocean with her two young children would
lead to their death. 65 The jury could also infer that due to the high
homicidal risk of a parent-child suicide attempt, Mrs. Kimura's ac-
tions exhibited an extreme reckless disregard for the life of her
children. 166
However, according to Model Penal Code section 210.3(1),167 a
homicide which would otherwise be "murder" can be reduced to
manslaughter if it is committed under the influence of an extreme
emotional or mental disturbance for which there is a reasonable ex-
planation. 6 Before the trier of fact determines the reasonableness of
Mrs. Kimura's emotional or mental state, it is necessary to first com-
prehend her "situation". 169
Mrs. Kimura's "situation" is quite different from that of the av-
erage American woman. Mrs. Kimura is a traditional Japanese wo-
man who strongly adheres to her cultural upbringing.1 70 She
"embrace[d] Japanese tradition even more strongly after the birth of
her children. 1 71 Unlike most American women, Mrs. Kimura felt
compelled to blame herself for her husband's infidelity and refused to
allow her children to bear the humiliation.
72
126, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 667. The court reasoned that defendant's son had slept throughout the
evening, thus he could not have provoked the defendant to a heat of passion. Id. However,
the court stated that the trial court correctly gave the manslaughter instructions as to defend-
ant's wife's death since she caused the provocation. Id.
162. Thomas C., 183 Cal. App. 3d at 798, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 437-38.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 146-49.
164. See supra text accompanying note 65.
165. See supra text accompanying note 67.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 69-73.
167. See supra text accompanying note 80.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 88-93.
169. Id.
170. L.A. Times, Feb. 24, 1985, pt. I, at 30, col. 1.
171. Id.
172. L.A. Times, Nov. 22, 1985, pt. II, at 8, cols. 4-6.
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After comprehending Mrs. Kimura's "situation", the jury could
more fully evaluate the reasonableness of Mrs. Kimura's conduct and
emotional state. Under all the circumstances, it would not be that
unreasonable for a woman in Mrs. Kimura's situation to resolve her
problems in the honorable, traditional manner of oyako-shinju.1
73
5. A comparative assessment of the codes
Under the California law, if the court found that the killing was
intentional, Mrs. Kimura would be presumed to have harbored malice
aforethought. 74 Mrs. Kimura would then be prosecuted for either
first or second degree murder unless there was a mitigating factor.175
Under the current California law, the provocation-heat of passion de-
fense which reduces the gravity of the crime to voluntary manslaugh-
ter does not seem to apply to Kimura's case.17 6 Consequently, Mrs.
Kimura's attorney recognized that this mitigating factor was not
available and contended that Mrs. Kimura was legally insane at the
time of the incident.
77
Model Penal Code section 210.3(1)178 has various advantages
over California Penal Code section 192.179 First, unlike the California
law regarding the doctrine of voluntary manslaughter-heat of passion,
the Model Penal Code does not require that the defendant's emotional
distress arise from the provocative acts perpetrated by the victim. 80
Instead, Model Penal Code section 210.3(l)(b) encompasses a greater
variety of circumstances where the defendant is "adequately
provoked."'
8'
Second, under California Penal Code section 192, the legislature
has conveniently reduced murder to manslaughter by concluding that
heat of passion negates malice aforethought even when the defendant
had the intent to kill.18 2 More properly stated, the law recognizes the
significance of inquiring into the reasons for the defendant's formula-
tion of the intent to kill.183 The Model Penal Code provides that
173. See supra text accompanying notes 100-02.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 27-32.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 42-45, 53.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 143-63.
177. L.A. Times, Mar. 29, 1985, pt. II, at 3, col. 2.
178. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1) (1962).
179. CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West Supp. 1987).
180. 1 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, pt. II, § 210.3, at 60-61 (1980).
181. Id.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 143-44.
183. 1 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, pt. II, § 210.3, at 54-55 (1980).
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"[o]ne who kills in response to certain provoking events should be
regarded as demonstrating a significantly different character defi-
ciency than one who kills in their absence." 184 Hence, the Model Pe-
nal Code concedes that some personal characteristics of the defendant
must be considered.1
8 5
Unlike California Penal Code section 192, the Model Penal Code
permits the jury to inquire into the defendant's "situation" and
thereby intelligently determine whether her actions were reason-
able. 186 Consequently, it is preferable to apply a more flexible test
such as Model Penal Code section 210.3(l)(b) instead of mitigating
Kimura's offense to manslaughter by claiming she was insane.
187
As previously discussed, California has abolished the diminished
capacity defense.18 8 While the Model Penal Code might seem to in-
corporate the diminished capacity defense, it has not done so.'
8 9
There may be certain situations where the defendant's mental condi-
tion may have no just bearing on his or her intentional homicide. 90
Nonetheless, there are other situations, such as Mrs. Kimura's cul-
ture, which are relevant to the moral assessment or "reasonable-
ness" 91 of a defendant's conduct.
It is a given fact that there are certain minimal standards of con-
duct to which every member of the society must conform. Conform-
ance with these standards is achieved by penalizing the wrongdoer for
disregarding the law. However, in Kimura's case the loss of her chil-
dren was her greatest punishment. 92 Mrs. Kimura is certainly not a
threat to society. 193 Moreover, a sentence of voluntary manslaughter
pursuant to Model Penal Code section 210.3(1)(b) may provide a suffi-
cient deterrent to dissuade other persons of Japanese ancestry living
in the United States from committing the same offense. Therefore,
due to the unusual nature of this case, the court should have either
184. Id. at 55.
185. Id. at 54-55.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 88-93.
187. See supra text accompanying note 177.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 62-64.
189. 1 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, pt. II, § 210.3, at 72 (1980).
190. Id. Under Model Penal Code section 210.3, although the defendant's mental condi-
tion may be abnormal, the jury still has to determine the "reasonableness" of the defendant's
conduct. Id. Thus, unlike the defense of diminished capacity, "the Model Code does not
authorize mitigation on the basis of individual abnormality without any measure of the defend-
ant against an objective measure." Id.
191. Id.
192. L.A. Times, Feb. 24, 1985, pt. I, at 31, col. 6.
193. Id.
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allowed Mrs. Kimura's cultural background to be introduced as a
separate mitigating factor, or permitted the defense to introduce to
the jury the cultural implications of her act in order to properly assess
Mrs. Kimura's situation.
194
C. California Law and the Model Penal Code: Marriage by
Capture
1. The rape statutes
California Penal Code section 261 defines rape as an act of sexual
intercourse accomplished with a person not the spouse of the perpe-
trator under any of the following circumstances:
(2) where [the act is] accomplished against a person's will by
means of force or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on
the person or another ... (5) where [the victim] submits under the
[erroneous] belief that the person committing the act is the victim's
spouse, and this belief is induced by... the accused... (6) where
the act is accomplished against the victim's will by threatening to
retaliate in the future [for example, by kidnapping, false imprison-
ment or infliction of extreme pain, serious bodily injury or death]
against the victim or any other person, and there is a reasonable
possibility that the perpetrator will execute the threat. 195
Rape, as defined in California Penal Code section 261, is punishable
by imprisonment in a state prison for up to eight years.196
The lack of consent is a determinative factor in the statute. In
California, consent is defined as "positive cooperation in act or atti-
tude pursuant to an exercise of free will. The person must act freely
and voluntarily and have knowledge of the nature of the act or trans-
action involved."' 97 However, the statute does not require an affirma-
tive exercise of the woman's will in opposition to the act if she is
194. See supra text accompanying notes 88-93.
195. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (West Supp. 1987). The other circumstances which
amount to rape under § 261 are: (1) the accused knows or reasonably should have known that
the person is incapable of giving legal consent because of a mental disorder or developmental
or physical disability, id. § 261(1); (2) the victim is prevented from resisting due to anesthetic,
intoxication, or any controlled substance, administered by the accused, id. § 261(3); (3) the
accused knows that the person is at the time unconscious of the nature of the act, id. § 261(4);
(4) the act is accomplished against the victim's will by threatening to use a public authority to
incarcerate, arrest, or deport the victim or another, and the victim has a reasonable belief that
the perpetrator is a public official, id. § 261(7).
196. Id. § 264.
197. Id. § 261.6.
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incapable of using force at the time.198 Frequently, courts today state
that the lack of consent can be established by the woman's age,
strength, the surrounding facts and other attending circumstances. 199
Similar to California Penal Code section 261, Model Penal Code
section 213.1(1) limits the offense of rape to cases where the man has
had sexual intercourse with a female who is not his wife.2°° However,
the Model Code is distinguishable from California Penal Code section
261. The Model Code introduces a grading scheme by dividing rape
into three felony levels. 20' The most serious offense is aggression re-
sulting in serious bodily injury or when no voluntary social and sexual
relationship exists between the parties. 20 2 The man is guilty of second
degree rape when he compels the victim to submit by force or by cer-
tain specific serious threats.20 3
Gross sexual offense, the third degree felony under the Model
Penal Code, was punishable as rape under the common law.2°4 Model
Penal Code section 213.1 (2)(a) limits third degree felony rape to in-
stances where the threat is presumably not serious and force is not
used. 20 5 For example, gross sexual offense is found where the accused
compels the woman to submit by any threat that would prevent resist-
ance by a woman of ordinary resolution, or the woman mistakenly
believes the existence of a marital relationship between them.206
Model Penal Code section 213.1 thus departs from the single-
category approach to the punishment of rape by creating grading dis-
tinctions among the different forms of the offense.20 7 The Model
Code focuses on the culpability of the perpetrator, the coercive con-
duct and the degree of harm inflicted on the victim. 2°8 The Model
198. See R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 17, at 211-12.
199. Id.
200. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (1962).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. Furthermore, the defendant is guilty of second degree rape if (1) he has compelled
the woman to submit by substantially impairing her capacity to appraise or control her con-
duct by administering without her knowledge drugs or other intoxicants; or (2) the woman is
unconscious; or (3) the woman is less than 10 years old. Id.
204. 1 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, pt. II, § 213, at 271 (1980).
205. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(2)(a) (1962).
206. Id. 213.1(2)(a),(c). Other instances of gross sexual offense include where the man
knows the woman suffers from a mental disease or defect which renders her incapable of ap-
praising the nature of her conduct or where the man knows that the woman is unconscious of
the act. Id. 213.1(2)(b)-(c).
207. Id. § 213.1.
208. 1 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, pt. II, § 213.1, at 280 (1980).
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Code reasons that rape "is the only form of violent criminal assault in
which the physical act accomplished by the offender is an act which
may, under other circumstances, be desirable to the victim."2°9 "This
unique feature of the offense necessitates the drawing of a line be-
tween forcible rape on the one hand and reluctant submission on the
other, between true aggression and desired intimacy."
210
2. Marriage by capture (zij poj niam)
Another cultural conflict confronting American courts is the
traditional marriage ritual of the Hmongs, labeled "marriage by cap-
ture" by anthropologists and "rape" by the American criminal judici-
ary. Prior to the Hmongs arrival in the United States, the Hmongs
were nomadic farmers from the isolated hills of Laos.211 Due to the
strategic location of their homeland, which was between Laos and
Vietnam, the United States Central Intelligence Agency obtained the
assistance of the Hmongs to fight the North Vietnamese and Laotian
communists and to rescue downed American flyers in North Viet-
nam.21 2 When the United States' military involvement in Vietnam
ended, approximately 70,000 Hmongs in Laos were killed by revenge-
seeking communists. 21 3 Consequently, since 1980, an estimated
30,000 Hmongs have migrated to the San Joaquin Valley near Fresno,
California. 21
4
209. Shapo, Recent Statutory Developments in the Definition of Forcible Rape, 61 VA. L.
REV. 1500, 1503 (1975), quoted in 1 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, pt. II,
§ 213.1, at 279 (1980).
210. 1 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, pt. II, § 213.1 at 279-80 (1980).
211. Sherman, When Cultures Collide, CAL. LAW., Jan. 1986, at 33, 34.
212. Id.
213. Wall St. J., Feb. 16, 1983, at 1, col. 1. "[The Hmongs] were perhaps America's most
tenacious and loyal ally in Southeast Asia, losing 50,000 people, or 10% of their population, by
the time the United States' 'secret war' in Laos ended in 1975." Id.
214. Sherman, supra note 211, at 33. In the last three decades, more than 60,000 Hmong
refugees have come to live in the United States. L.A. Times, Apr. 7, 1985, pt. I, at 1, col. 2. Of
all the Asians that have immigrated to the United States, the Hmongs have had the most
difficulty assimilating into the American culture. Id. at 30. The Hmongs had no written lan-
guage of their own until thirty years ago. Sherman, supra note 211, at 34. Furthermore, their
language has no past tense and they have no conception of distance. Christian Science Moni-
tor, Mar. 30, 1981, at B13, col. 2.
Law enforcement officials believe that the Hmongs are generally law-abiding citizens and
are far more often victims, rather than perpetrators, of crime. L.A. Times, Apr. 7, 1985, pt. I,
at 3, col. 1. Providence police say they do not recall a single Hmong being arrested for a crime.
Wall St. J., Feb. 16, 1983, at 25, col. 3. Instead, "[d]ozens of Hmong have had their apart-
ments burglarized and cars stolen, and some Hmong children have been beaten walking home
from school. They seldom complain to the police because they still feel like 'guests' in
America." Id.
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In People v. Moua,215 a Hmong woman's family filed rape and
kidnapping charges against Kong Moua, a Hmong man, for perform-
ing marriage by capture.216 This marriage ritual is a legitimate form
of matrimony practiced by Hmong tribesmen and begins with the
man engaging in ritualized flirtation. 21 7 The woman responds by giv-
ing the man a token signifying acceptance of the courtship.218 The
man is then required to take the woman to his family's house in order
to consummate the union. 21 9 According to Hmong tradition, the wo-
man is required to protest: "No, no, no, I'm not ready. ' 220 If she
doesn't make overt protestations, such as weeping and moaning, she is
regarded as insufficiently virtuous and undesirable.221 The Hmong
man is required to ignore her mock objections, and firmly lead her
into the bedroom and consummate the marriage.222 If the suitor is
not assertive enough to take the initiative, he is regarded as too weak
to be her husband.
223
This Hmong marriage ritual was performed by Moua and led to
his arrest on rape and kidnapping charges. 224 However, Moua
claimed that he had received all the proper cultural signals from the
victim, and thus, he believed that she would not object to the mar-
riage ritual.225 For example, during the New Year's celebration, a
traditional time for courting, they had exchanged letters and tokens of
affection which led him to believe that she wanted to marry him.
226
The court in Moua had to determine if the victim's protests were
real and were not merely culturally oriented. 227 The prosecutor and
judge believed both the defendant, who genuinely thought the woman
wanted to have the union consummated, and the woman, who really
did not consent. 228 The defendant was allowed to plea bargain to the
215. People v. Moua, No. 315972-0 (Fresno Super. Ct.); see Sherman, supra note 7, at 27,
col. 1.
216. Id.
217. Dershowitz, 'Marriage by Capture'Runs into The Law of Rape, Wall St. J., June 14,







224. Sherman, supra note 7, at 27, col. 1.
225. Id. at 36.
226. Id.
227. Dershowitz, supra note 217, at 5, col. 2.
228. Id. at cols. 1-2. The plaintiff's attorney insisted that the plaintiff was Americanized
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misdemeanor of false imprisonment and the rape and kidnapping
charges were dropped. 229 The judge sentenced Moua to ninety days
in prison. 230 After the judge's ruling, the prosecutor conceded that
the court had considered the cultural defense to a certain extent.
231
In contrast with the court in Kimura, the court in Moua was
apparently more candid in its consideration of the Hmong marriage
rituals and the cultural difficulties that subject Hmong men to the
American rape laws. In fact, the judge, who presided over the Moua
case, was quoted as saying that the reduction of charges to misde-
meanor false imprisonment gave him "leeway to get into all these cul-
tural issues and to try to tailor a sentence that would fulfill both...
[American] needs and the Hmong needs. ' 232 However, as both
Kimura and Moua illustrate, the recurring problem of reconciling
what is socially accepted and ingrained in one culture, and a criminal
act in another, continues to face the American courts.
3. Application of the California rape statute
Protecting society, punishing and deterring the defendant and
other Hmong men from such criminal conduct (marriage by capture)
are the major objectives of sentencing.233 Under California Penal
Code section 261(2),234 Moua's matrimonial ritual could constitute
rape. The victim in Moua satisfied the first essential requirement of
California Penal Code section 261; she was not married to the perpe-
trator, Moua.235  Moreover, the consummation was apparently
against her will because she repeatedly and sincerely stated that she
was not consenting to his actions.236 Additionally, Moua's traditional
forceful behavior may be sufficient to trigger section 261(2) which re-
quires the use of force or coercion.
237
Alternatively, Moua may be prosecuted for rape pursuant to Cal-
and had rejected the Hmong tradition. Thompson, supra note 6, at 26, col. 4. He further
pointed out that the plaintiff had the right not to be kidnapped and raped against her will. Id.
229. Sherman, supra note 7, at 27, col. 1.
230. Id.
231. Thompson, supra note 6, at 26, col. 6.
232. Sherman, supra note 211, at 36.
233. See CAL. R. Ct. § 410.
234. See supra text accompanying note 195.
235. See Sherman, supra note 211, at 33.
236. Dershowitz, supra note 217, at 5, cols. 1-2.
237. See supra text accompanying note 195.
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ifornia Penal Code section 261(6)238 if the women submitted to Moua
due to fear of future retaliation such as kidnapping or false
imprisonment.
Furthermore, it can be contended that Moua's act may constitute
rape under California Penal Code section 261(5).239 The assertion
would be that Moua induced the Hmong woman to consummate the
union by deceiving her into believing that according to the Hmong
culture, since they were sharing the same bed, they were presently
married. She thereby submitted under the mistaken belief that Moua
was her husband. Such inducement, which results in her passive sub-
mission, is rape under California Penal Code section 261(5). Simi-
larly, Model Penal Code section 213.1(2)24o penalizes the defendant
for seducing a woman by deceiving her as to their marital status.
However, under the Model Penal Code, the defendant is charged with
gross sexual imposition instead of first degree rape as in California
Penal Code section 261(5).241
Nevertheless, this is a weak argument because both California
Penal Code section 261(5) and Model Penal Code section 213.1(2)
were drafted to cover different situations. For example, they were in-
tended to cover instances where the defendant impersonates the vic-
tim's husband, or when the defendant induces the woman to enter a
void marriage by deceiving her as to his eligibility to marry, or when
the man stages a sham marriage to create the false supposition that
they were legally married. 24 2
4. Application of the Model Penal Code
Under California Penal Code section 261, Moua's action could
be construed as first degree rape since the various types of rape are
lumped into a single category. Conversely, under the three-tier
scheme of Model Penal Code section 213.1, Moua's action would not
amount to first degree rape. First, Moua's matrimonial ritual would
not constitute first degree rape under Model Penal Code section 213.1
because there was an existing social relationship between them.243
When determining the degree of rape, the Model Penal Code consid-
238. Id. It is not clear from the facts of the case whether the woman feared that Moua
would retaliate in the future.
239. Id.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 205-06.
241. Id.
242. 1 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, pt. II, § 213.1, at 332 (1980).
243. See supra text accompanying notes 225-26.
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ers whether the perpetrator was a total stranger to the victim.244
"The law of rape protects against unwanted sexual intimacy, and it is
reasonable to believe that such conduct is especially shocking and in-
jurious when the actor is a stranger.
245
Secondly, according to Model Penal Code section 213.1, the
'" 'no prior relationship' provision for escalating the penalty of rape is
also responsive to... the magnitude of harm involved. ' '246 Moua did
not inflict serious bodily injury on anyone. Thus, under Model Penal
Code section 213.1, Moua would not be guilty of first degree rape
because he had a prior social relationship with the victim and because
he failed to inflict serious bodily injury on her.
Nonetheless, Moua could be prosecuted under Model Penal
Code section 213.1 for second or third degree rape. The focus of the
inquiry for second degree rape is on the defendant's degree of force
and the seriousness of the defendant's accused threats.247 If Moua
threatened the victim with imminent death, kidnapping or serious
bodily injury, he could be penalized for second degree rape.248 How-
ever, if he threatened the victim with a less serious harm, Moua could
be found guilty of third degree rape (also known as gross sexual impo-
sition) pursuant to Model Penal Code section 213.2.249
5. A comparative assessment of the codes
One perceived problem with California Penal Code section 261 is
that different forms of rape involving varying degrees of culpability
are lumped into a single category. 250 "The effect of such laws ... [is]
to authorize grave sanctions for a range of conduct that includes of-
fense[s] plainly less serious than the most aggravated forms of
rape. ' 251 Thus, because section 261 is overinclusive, Moua, who had
no intent to commit a crime, could be found guilty of first degree rape.
Furthermore, due to the fact that rape is not a specific intent
crime, ignorance of the law is no excuse.252 The court could therefore
ignore the anthropological evidence which demonstrates that Moua
244. 1 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, pt. II, § 213.1 at 355 (1980).
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. See supra text accompanying note 203.
248. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(1)(a) (1967).
249. See supra text accompanying notes 204-06.
250. 1 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, pt. II, § 213.1, at 278 (1980).
251. Id.
252. See People v. Bishop, 132 Cal. App. 3d 717, 722, 183 Cal. Rptr. 414, 417 (1982);
People v. Guthreau, 102 Cal. App. 3d 436, 443, 162 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1980).
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had no intent to rape the plaintiff.25 3 Hence, since section 261 lumps
the various types of rape into a single category and intent is irrelevant,
Moua could be exposed to the same punishment that a first degree,
cold-hearted rapist would receive. It is difficult to believe that the
Legislature in adopting section 261 intended to penalize a refugee for
statutory rape if the accused was merely conforming to his cultural
ritual and had no intent to commit a crime.
Since Moua may be found guilty of first degree rape pursuant to
California Penal Code section 261, the defense that he entertained a
reasonable and good faith belief that the woman voluntarily consented
to engage in sexual intercourse should be considered. 254 While it may
be difficult for the court to accept such a defense when the woman
expressly manifests her disapproval, the underlying fact the court
should consider is that in the Hmong culture, the woman's vehement
refusal is construed as consent to the consummation of union.255
Thus, in the interest of justice, the court should consider the culture
of the accused. After all, it is reasonable for a Hmong man to believe
that a Hmong woman is consenting to his actions, because the Hmong
culture requires her to protest the consummation in order to prove
that she is virtuous.
256
Unlike California Penal Code section 261, Model Penal Code
section 213.1 provides more flexibility in tailoring a sentence that
would best serve the defendant, as well as society. Under Model Pe-
nal Code section 213.1, Moua would probably be convicted for gross
sexual imposition, a third degree rape.257 The Model Penal Code
more strongly emphasizes the defendant's culpability and intent than
does the California Penal Code.25 8 In weighing the defendant's culpa-
bility, the court would likely consider his culture and his intent. The
court could then use its discretion in reducing the sentence. Further-
more, due to the ambiguities relating to the issue of whether the wo-
man has consented, the Model Penal Code does not emphasize the
consent of the woman.259 Hence, Moua, under Model Penal Code
section 213.1, would not be subject to the same punishment as some-
253. Sherman, supra note 211, at 36.
254. See People v. Acevedo, 166 Cal. App. 3d 196, 202, 212 Cal. Rptr. 328, 332 (1985).
255. See supra text accompanying notes 217-23.
256. Id.
257. See supra text accompanying notes 204-06.
258. See supra text accompanying notes 208-10.
259. 1 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, pt. II, § 213.1, at 303-06 (1980).
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one who intentionally and maliciously raped the victim. 26 0
In Moua, the judge considered Moua's cultural beliefs and con-
cluded that Moua did not intend to harm the victim. 261 The judge
used his discretion by allowing Moua to plea bargain to misdemeanor
false imprisonment.262 However, the court's approach does not pro-
vide a clear guideline or precedent of how courts should confront a
similar cultural conflict in the future.
An appropriate sentence in Moua would have been third degree
rape pursuant to Model Penal Code section 213.1; a harsher sentence
than false imprisonment but milder than first degree rape under Cali-
fornia Penal Code section 261. Such a sentence would provide a
clearer guideline for future judicial action. Thus, if the court in Moua
adopted Model Penal Code section 213.1, there would be some assur-
ance that in a future similar case, a court would demonstrate similar
latitude by reducing the penalty to third degree rape rather than false
imprisonment.
III. CONFLICTING VIEWPOINTS AND ANALYSIS OF CULTURAL
DEFENSE
There are two conflicting viewpoints which frame the "cultural
defense" issue.
A. Traditional View
The traditional view is that everyone must conform to the law,
and that ignorance of the law is no excuse for non-compliance. 263
This viewpoint shall be referred to as the "traditional view". In a
famous English case, Regina v. Barronet,264 one justice stated
" '[p]ersons who fly to this country as an asylum must obey the laws
of the country and be content to place themselves in the same situa-
tion as native born subjects.' ",265 Similarly, another justice in Bar-
ronet stated that foreigners must be dealt with in the same way as
natives,266 and that a native's ignorance of the law cannot be an ex-
260. See supra text accompanying note 196.
261. See supra text accompanying notes 227-32.
262. Id.
263. Samuels, Legal Recognition and Protection of Minority Customs in a Plural Society in
England, 10 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 241 (1981).
264. Regina v. Barronet, 169 Eng. Rep. 633 (Q.B. 1852).
265. Id., quoted in Samuels, supra note 263, at 242.
266. Id.
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cuse for a crime and cannot be urged in favor of a foreigner. 267 Addi-
tionally, a third justice stated
To make a difference in the case of foreigners would be a most
dangerous practice. It is of great importance that the administra-
tion of the law should be uniform. It must be administered with-
out respect to persons and it would be dangerous and unjust to
introduce into a general rule an exception in favour of
foreigners.268
Though Barronet was decided in 1852, prosecutors today, such
as the prosecutor in Kimura, adhere to this traditional view. In
Kimura, the prosecution stated that "[m]urder must be considered
murder in the United States and not mitigated by legal or cultural
standards from other countries. '269 The court rejected the applica-
tion of Japanese law and Kimura's culture. 270 The prosecution fur-
ther claimed that "[y]ou're treading on . . . shaky ground when you
decide something based on a cultural thing because our society is
made up of so many different cultures. It is very hard to draw the line
somewhere, but they are living in our country and people have to
abide by our laws or else you have anarchy."'27' Law enforcement
officials also share the view expressed in Kimura.272 For example, one
official succinctly rebutted the cultural defense raised in Kimura by
stating that "[t]he problem is we're not in Japan .... We're here." 273
1. Public policy advantages of the traditional view
Penalizing a criminal under American law has been shown to
have a deterrent effect. 274 For example, due to the stigma that results
from an arrest and prosecution for rape and kidnapping, the Hmong
recognize that they can no longer follow their customary way of
claiming a bride. 27 5 The Hmong, no matter how endeared to their
267. Id.
268. Id., quoted in Samuels, supra note 263, at 243.
269. Sherman, supra note 7, at 26, col. 1.
270. See supra text accompanying note 110.
271. Sherman, supra note 7, at 26, col. 1.
272. Id.
273. Thompson, supra note 6, at 26, col. 4 (quoting Lieutenant Glenn Ackerman, head of
the Los Angeles Police Department's sixteen officer Asian Task Force).
274. Id. at 26, col. 6.
275. Id. The Fresno Deputy Public Defender claimed that the Hmongs in Fresno fol-
lowed the rape trial very closely. Id. Consequently, they are trying to adjust their traditions.
Id. Similarly, another criminal defense attorney who represents Asian immigrants stated that
as the Asians get arrested and imprisoned, the word gets out to the rest of the Asian commu-
nity. Id.
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traditional cultural views, must adapt their old cultural patterns to
the developing American concepts of sexual equality.2 76 By penaliz-
ing the Hmong, we are indirectly informing them that they have to
conform to American concepts of sexual equality.277 In effect, the
American criminal justice system is instructing the foreigner that his
acts are an unacceptable social behavior, and contrary to public policy
in the United States.
2. Disadvantages of the traditional view
The traditional view, which requires foreigners to conform to the
majority's standards and values, results in the demise of foreign cul-
tural values.278 For example, the Hmong children are being quickly
Americanized and are losing their culture.279 Consequently, the older
generation of the Hmong are somber and wish they could return to
their homeland.280 Cultural problems have even led to mysterious
sleeping deaths of middle-aged Hmong males.28' However, many as-
pects of foreign cultures can greatly enrich and contribute to Ameri-
can life.282 For instance, the Hmong are a unique people due to their
strong sense of social bonding.28 3 "The Hmong people still love each
other and worry about each other," stated one member of the Hmong
community. 28
4
Furthermore, respect for the individual and his personal customs
is an integral part of human rights.285 "[F]or newcomers to deny
their original culture means to deny their self-esteem and identity." 28
6
The Hmong try hard to assimilate into the American culture and
gladly abide by American law.
Consequently, support of community outreach programs to edu-
cate refugees and immigrants about American laws and customs is
essential. A "less coercive approach in educating immigrants is both
276. Dershowitz, supra note 217, at 5, col. 3.
277. Id.
278. See L.A. Times, Apr. 7, 1985, pt. I, at 31, cols. 4-5.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 31, cols. 3-6.
281. Id. at 31, col. 1. It is speculated that the mysterious deaths were caused by severe
cultural shock and stress. Wall St. J., Feb. 16, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
282. Samuels, supra note 263, at 255.
283. San Francisco Chron., Jan. 29, 1984, Cal. Living Magazine, at 11.
284. Id.
285. Samuels, supra note 263, at 255.
286. Hayashi, supra note 4, at 5, col. 3.
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less traumatic for them and easier on the criminal justice system." 27
For example, a basic problem for the Hmong is that they do not know
what to change and what to preserve from their old life style. Hence,
community projects should discourage the Hmong, as well as other
foreigners, from practicing cultural habits that may pose legal
problems and encourage those other habits which will enrich Ameri-
can society as a whole.
B. Modern View
Contrary to the traditional view, there is considerable support for
recognizing the defendant's foreign culture and applying the law of
the defendant's country in a criminal proceeding. 288 For example, in
Kimura, the Japanese community in Los Angeles sympathized with
Mrs. Kimura because she was to be punished under American, rather
than Japanese law.289 According to a Japanese woman, Mrs.
Kimura's actions were the result of her Japanese custom and upbring-
ing.290 The Japanese believe that custom is ingrained in a person's
mind.291
The general consensus of this modem view is that when analyz-
ing the defendant's mens rea or "state of mind," the courts must con-
sider that person's cultural beliefs. 292 Proponents of this view argue
that the defendant's culture is entwined with his or her mental state at
the time of the crime. 293 As recited by a local leader of the Hmong,
"being Hmong is more than a shared culture or a collective memory
of mountaintop villages, but rather a state of mind: a feeling of sup-
port, a graciousness in living and a love of one another. '294 There-
fore, to support the public policy consideration of fairness to the
defendant, it is believed that the courts should consider cultural
defenses.
IV. CONCLUSION
We would be living in a state of anarchy if each foreigner's cul-
287. Thompson, supra note 6, at 26, col. 7.
288. See infra text accompanying notes 289-94.
289. Sherman, supra note 7, at 26, col. 1. The 4,000 members of the Japanese community,
in their petition, asked the prosecutor to apply "modern Japanese law." Id. at 1, col. 3.
290. See Hayashi, supra note 4, at 5, col. 3.
291. Id.
292. Sherman, supra note 7, at 27, col. 3.
293. See supra text accompanying notes 292-94.
294. San Francisco Chron., Jan. 29, 1984, Cal. Living Magazine, at 11.
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ture and law was the determinant factor of what is right and wrong.
There is a need for uniformity in the law. A defendant should be
penalized for the wrong or harm which he or she has inflicted. How-
ever, in reconciling the different public policy concerns and view-
points, the cultural beliefs of the defendant should mitigate the
punishment, especially in the case of a first offender. The defendant's
state of mind is certainly an important component of his or her
culpability.
In Kimura, the provocation-heat of passion defense was not used
and seemed inapplicable. Consequently, the court mitigated Mrs.
Kimura's offense, from murder to voluntary manslaughter by finding
that she was legally insane at the time of the suicide attempt. How-
ever, if the court had applied the Model Penal Code, the jury could
have considered Mrs. Kimura's cultural background when assessing
the reasonableness of her actions. They could then have found her
guilty of manslaughter. The court would have reached the same re-
sult under both the Model Penal Code and California Penal Code.
However, the Model Penal Code provides a preferable approach since
the court does not need to create the legal fiction that the defendant
was legally insane when she was merely adhering to her cultural
values.
Unlike Kimura, the judge in Moua did consider the defendant's
culture. Since the California rape statute lumps the various types of
rape into a single category, first degree rape, the judge simply disre-
garded the rape statute and found the defendant, Moua, guilty of false
imprisonment. The judge did not believe that Moua was as culpable
as a cold-hearted rapist. However, under the Model Penal Code's
three-tier grading system, Moua's action would be considered third
degree rape. Thus, the Model Penal Code provides an appropriate
compromise: a harsher sentence than merely ninety days imprison-
ment, but a milder sentence than first degree rape. Therefore, in
unique cases such as those discussed in this Comment, the Model Pe-
nal Code's flexible approach will lead to clearer precedents and more
just results since factors such as the cultural background will be
considered.
Malek-Mithra Sheybani
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